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Reputation systems are a popular feature of web-based platforms for ensuring that their users abide by platform 
rules and regulations, and are incentivised to demonstrate honest, trustworthy conduct. Accrual of 'reputation' in 
these platforms, most prominently those in the e-commerce domain, is motivated by self-interested goals, such as 
acquiring an advantage over competing platform users. Therefore, in community-oriented platforms, where the 
goals are to foster collaboration and cooperation among community members, such reputation systems are 
inappropriate and indeed contrary to the intended ethos of the community and actions of its members. 
In this paper, we argue for a new form of reputation system that encourages cooperation rather than competition, 
derived from conceptualising platform communities as a networked assemblage of users and their created content. 
In doing so, we use techniques from social network analysis to conceive a form of reputation that represents 
members' community involvement over a period of time, rather than a sum of direct ratings from other members. 
We describe the design and implementation of our reputation system prototype called 'commonshare' and 
preliminary results of its use within a Digital Social Innovation platform. Further, we discuss its potential to generate 
insight into other networked communities for their administrators, and encourage cooperation between their users. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1776) described a new type of society that was 
emerging in the 18th century: the commercial society. This was characterised by increased 
social complexity, compared to traditional societies, due to a far more articulated division of 
labour, with individuals needing to interact with people and commercial partners they did not 
know much about. Smith saw recognition of consistent, repeated good conduct in others - or 
more simply, reputation - as the glue that kept commercial societies together, as it facilitated 
dealings with potentially unknown parties. Good conduct was a moral aspect, maintained out 
of individual self-interest, and considered by Smith as the “general principle which regulates 
the action of every man” (Smith, 1776, p. 29). 
Achieving social order remains a relevant problem in our digital and networked society, with 
millions if not billions of people and organisations interacting online often with limited or no 
knowledge of the parties they are interacting with (Roser et al., 2015). It has long been 
argued that reputation is an important aspect facilitating collective action and promoting 
social order in “artificial societies” (Conte & Paolucci, 2002). One way to facilitate social 
order in online relations is to reproduce, in digital form, some dynamics that are associated 
with good conduct in (offline) society. This is achieved with ‘reputation systems’, which can 
capture, aggregate and display the reputation of unknown parties interacting online. 
Reputation systems are the proxies (Floridi, 2015) of distant actors, measuring their “good 
conduct” in past interactions. In many areas of the social web, the moral principle theorised 
by Smith thus manifests itself in reputation systems. However, a consequence of this is that 
individual self-interest is assumed, often uncritically, as the main underlying principle of the 
 
design of these systems. This can be seen in the work of influential authors such as 
Dellarocas (2003) or Farmer and Glass (2010). 
Reputation systems based on individualistic models are common in e-commerce websites 
(e.g. eBay or Amazon) in the form of rating systems, but they are now present in other 
platforms where communities of users operate. However, the digitisation of word-of-mouth 
dynamics that exists in offline communities need not necessarily be based on individualism 
or self-interest, nor is it obvious that this can deliver a design that meets the needs of all 
types of online communities. Individualistic models of reputation inevitably shape the 
relations within an online community. Some of these assumptions may work for certain 
contexts, such as e-commerce, but may be far less effective in other contexts. 
Elsewhere, we have made the point that individualistic reputation design principles may 
actually clash with the goals of communities that have collective action, emancipation, the 
building of commons and reciprocal support at their core (Wilson and De Paoli, 2019). This 
paper builds on our previous discussion by addressing one main question: how can we 
redesign online reputation as a concept that first embraces the consideration of the 
community as a whole, and then the articulation of the community with the individuals that 
compose it? We approach this question by conceptualising online social communities as 
assemblages (DeLanda, 2019) and considering that reputation is an emergent property of 
these assemblages, rather than an essential property of each individual in a community. For 
the purpose of modelling a reputation system, this therefore requires a conceptualisation of 
online communities not as the sum of individuals, as proposed by Dellarocas (2010), but 
rather as assemblages of people and informational objects. In socio-computational terms, 
we propose to use social network analysis to compute a reputation metric that is derived 
from the properties of socio-technical assemblages, rather than from ratings provided by 
individuals focused on satisfying their own interest. This follows a suggestion from DeLanda 
(2019) that social network analysis can be used to capture the dynamics of a community as 
an assemblage. We take this idea forward by using a model to measure the density of a 
network proposed by Batagelj and Zaversnik (2003) and applying it to produce a reputation 
metric for an online community.  
To this end, this paper describes a prototype reputation system based on Assemblage 
Theory. Our reputation model, which we call commonshare, is one outcome of a Digital 
Social Innovation research project aimed at designing and building a platform (called 
Commonfare.net) – a dedicated online community devoted to social innovation in the areas 
of poverty emancipation and alternative forms of welfare. The purpose of Commonfare.net is 
to support people who have been affected by poverty or unemployment in sharing their 
stories of emancipation and reaction to their conditions. Designing for this specific 
community led us to a critique of individualistic reputation models and to the 
conceptualisation of the commonshare as a system based on relationality and community 
density. The commonshare is currently a working prototype and in this paper, we will present 
its theoretical foundations, its computational modelling, and some initial results from its use. 
 
 
INDIVIDUALISM IN REPUTATION SYSTEMS 
According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, reputation is “the opinion that people in 
general have about someone or something, or how much respect or admiration someone or 
something receives, based on past behaviour or character” (2020). This definition relates to 
the idea of ‘good conduct’ based on past interactions, as elaborated by Adam Smith. 
Reputation could also be defined more formally as “a collective measure of trustworthiness 
(in the sense of reliability) based on the referrals or ratings from members in a community” 
(Jøsang, 2007). This definition points to a relevant connection between reputation and trust; 
while these are often used synonymously (Hendrikx et al., 2015), they are overlapping but 
distinct concepts that must be discussed separately to understand the concept of reputation 
and its modelling in online communities. 
Luhmann (2000, p. 103) defined trust as “an attitude which allows for risk-taking decisions”. 
When social actors cannot anticipate the outcomes of their actions, they employ trust as a 
way of managing the risk associated with uncertainty. Trust has also been related to the 
notion of social capital (Putnam, 2000), and has a functional role in supporting cooperative 
relations (Gambetta, 1998). Trust can also be viewed as a three-part relation, involving a 
trustor (the actor placing trust), a trustee (another actor upon which trust is placed) and an 
object of trust (the focus of the trustor's action/decision) (Sztompka, 1999). For example, we 
can think about two parents (the trustor) that leave their children (the object of trust) with a 
babysitter (the trustee). A trust relationship is formed between the parents and the 
babysitter, whereby the parents assume a risk, not entirely knowing in advance whether the 
babysitter will be capable of minding the child. By trusting the trustee, the parents are able to 
take the seemingly risky decision to leave their child under the care of a stranger.  
Reputation can be defined in relation to trust, wherein according to the three-part relation, 
the trustor is seen as an entire community or group of people, who consider the 
trustworthiness of community members. Reputation is often based on word-of-mouth 
dynamics. Referring to the previous example, friends and acquaintances of the parents who 
also have small children (a community of people - the trustor) may recommend a particular 
babysitter among many (a trustee) based on their positive past experiences with that 
babysitter. This will allow the parents to reduce their risk as they know that other people in a 
similar situation have had a positive experience with the babysitter. The parents can know 
that the babysitter has had previous ‘good conduct’. 
In the online world, reputation has become a central component of a variety of websites and 
platforms. Reputation is permeating the social web to such an extent that some authors have 
argued that we are moving swiftly toward a “Reputation Society” (Masum & Zhang, 2004; 
Newmark, 2011) or a “Reputation Economy” (Gandini, 2016), where reputation becomes the 
central form of social capital, uniting distant actors in working online communities. In this 
sense, reputation systems are the digitisation of the cumulative processes of actions, 
judgments and word-of-mouth dynamics that otherwise exist in offline communities 
(Dellarocas, 2003). The most prominent examples are in e-commerce platforms such as 
eBay or Amazon. These rely on their reputation systems to facilitate successful transactions 
between community members in the absence of direct face-to-face contact or the assurance 
of a well-established business (Panagopoulos et al., 2017).  
 
 
There are different models for computing reputation, comprehensive reviews of which are 
provided by Hendrikx et al. (2015) and Jøsang et al. (2007). However, the reputation 
systems of e-commerce platforms are the most dominant and diffused approaches 
(Panagopoulos et al., 2017). In these systems, buyers and sellers enter into a commercial-
cooperative exchange, after which buyers are asked to rate their overall experience of the 
transaction on a scale (e.g., Amazon’s 1-5 stars, or eBay’s negative/neutral/positive 
feedback). Future buyers can then see the aggregated ratings from a group of past buyers 
(the trustor) and thus decide whether to purchase an item (the object of trust) from a seller 
(the trustee). Other approaches include, for example, more explicit gamification strategies 
such as the use of points or badges to recognise achievements (Deterding, 2012) or simple 
counting of votes/marks of approval, commonly implemented in Massive Open Online 
Courses (MOOCs) (Howley et al., 2017).  
The variation in reputation needs from different communities is familiar to designers and 
theorists, and the design of an appropriate reputation system requires careful consideration. 
However, as mentioned in our introduction, there is often an uncritical acceptance that 
various reputation models can be built, starting from individualistic assumptions. This is clear 
in what Farmer and Glass (2010, p. 122) have called the “competitive spectrum” of 
reputation, presented in their influential book dedicated to the design of web reputation 
systems. The competitive spectrum is a well-known pattern for reputation design proposed 
as a way to help designers make decisions about the reputation models they should employ 
for the community they are building. The authors argue that, when building a reputation 
system, it is always important for designers to consider the purpose of the community, what 
kind of actions need to be rewarded (i.e., what counts as ‘good conduct’), and how these 
rewards should be represented (for example, with points, stars, or badges). The idea is that 
communities with different goals require different reputation models.  
In communities where there is high competition, Farmer and Glass (2010) propose that 
reputation systems may include user rankings for comparing performances, such as that 
used in competitive online games. Rankings, however, would not be appropriate for 
communities with goals of cooperation, or reciprocal support, as rankings would inevitably 
put community members on a competitive, rather than a cooperative, course. In such cases, 
the authors argue that senior community members of good standing may have status 
badges to illustrate that they are “helpful” to others. In doing so, other community members 
can determine the value of help from these senior representatives more easily. As an 
example, Moser et al. (2017) studied how trustworthy behaviour was stimulated on “Mom-to-
Mom” Facebook groups where mothers buy, sell, swap and donate toys and clothes. 
Facebook does not provide any formal reputation system, thus trust was instead stimulated 
by the shared values of its members and behaviour regulations enforced by group 
administrators.  
Although the notion of a competitive spectrum explains differences in communities’ goals 
and needs, there tends to be a common assumption: that individuals are always the sources 
and recipients of reputation. Under this assumption, even reputation models that aim to 
encourage cooperative behaviour are still designed around one’s individual contribution, and 
thus promote self-satisfaction. In certain situations, this model may be justifiable - major e-
commerce platforms continue to employ reputation systems that encourage the simple 
accumulation of positive feedback, serving both buyers by quantifying and ranking the odds 
 
of a successful purchase, and sellers by consequently attracting more sales. However, 
theorists like Dellarocas, who make the point that online reputation amounts to digitized 
word-of-mouth in communities, always simultaneously describe communities in the social 
web as a sum of individuals (Dellarocas, 2010). Likewise, Farmer and Glass (2010) argue 
for an atomistic approach to design. In this approach, reputation statements (the building 
blocks/atoms of a reputation model) come in the form of a source making a reputation 
statement about something or somebody else (e.g., a buyer rates a seller after a purchase, 
or a user gives a ‘like’ to another user’s content, like a video). Then, several individual 
reputation statements are aggregated to form an overall indicator of trust, such as a metric 
or a badge.  
Similar forms of individualistic reputation can also be observed in platforms outside of the e-
commerce domain, across the competitive spectrum. One prevalent example is Stack 
Overflow, a popular question-answering community in which members post queries on 
software and programming problems, accruing reputation points and badges that are 
indicative of the usefulness of their contributions (Bosu et al., 2013; Movshovitz-Attias et al., 
2013). In Stack Overflow, community reputation resembles “contributive social capital” 
(Schams et al. 2010), a form of social capital that represents “a person’s value-add [to their 
social network] due to their competence, trustworthiness, and social responsibility”. In Stack 
Overflow's reputation system, the motives for acquiring reputation are often related to self-
esteem, rather than economic maximisation.  
THE COMMONFARE.NET PLATFORM AND THE NEED FOR A NEW 
MODEL 
Mainstream approaches to reputation design tend to put individuals at the centre and model 
the reputation system by conceptualising (and consequently shaping) communities as a sum 
of separate individuals seeking self-satisfaction and self-interest. However, not all online 
communities see the prevalence of the individual over the collective. Communities aiming to 
create commons tend to accommodate community interest over individual self-interest and 
thus warrant a different starting point for reputation design.  
This section of the paper describes the Commonfare.net platform, providing context for its 
specific components to be discussed in the following sections, its socio-political orientation, 
and to illustrate how and why an approach to reputation design differing from mainstream 
individualistic approaches was required. Commonfare.net is a prototype mobile-first, web-
based Digital Social Innovation (DSI) platform. The project was funded by the European 
Commission through the Collective Awareness Platforms for Social Innovation (CAPS) 
initiative. DSI projects, where technology is applied towards a goal of positive social impact, 
are classic examples of complex socio-technical systems, requiring a joint focus on 
understanding social needs that guide technical system design, and on understanding the 
impact of technical decisions on the social system being designed for. 
Commonfare.net is a DSI platform, through which people experiencing precarious income 
and employment conditions can take action to improve their situations. Commonfare.net 
aims to be bottom-up, socially equitable, and cooperative through its promotion of 
“commonfare”, an alternative approach to social welfare (Fumagalli & Lucarelli, 2015). Key 
 
features of commonfare include the reappropriation of the common (including immaterial and 
material goods), provision of a Basic Income to all members of society and development of 
alternative, complementary financial circuits for the management and circulation of social 
wealth. The platform’s main goal is to offer a social innovation route that people could 
embrace to improve their living conditions, especially those who are at risk of, or actively 
experiencing, precarity and social exclusion. Participants in the project included young 
people who were unemployed or in precarious employment, non-Western migrants, and 
benefit recipients. Commonfare.net offers a complementary channel for the provision of 
social welfare, and creation of alternative support and empowerment mechanisms. Thus, 
one of the platform’s core goals is to facilitate bottom-up cooperation, with users sharing 
resources (such as skills, experiences and perspectives) to improve their lives, thereby 
creating a "common". Key platform features are as follows:  
● User and group profiles for displaying individual and collective information 
● A digital currency system for facilitating the exchange of goods and services 
● Systems to encourage constructive, cooperative interactions, such as story sharing 
● Systems to assess contribution and/or correct platform use  
This paper focuses on this final feature. In the remainder of this section, we briefly present 
the other features and their role in achieving the platform’s goals. This will reinforce the 
relevance of our work - the design of a system to assess the contribution to 
Commonfare.net. 
<Insert Figure 1 here> 
Figure 1. The Commoners’ Voices section of Commonfare.net as it appears on desktop and mobile 
Users in the platform are called “commoners” - a name chosen to emphasise that 
participants are more than merely individual “users” insofar as they contribute together to 
build a common. The platform allows commoners to write stories on their own experiences, 
ways of coping with problems, their own social innovations, and critical reflections on issues. 
Examples include:  
● A workers’ self-organised nursery enabling their reconciliation of both parenthood 
and work needs. 
● Recovery of a closed factory where its redundant workers have, with no help from 
public authorities, created new productions, and thereby work for themselves.  
● A people’s clinic, where volunteer doctors offer medical services for the less well-off, 
with equipment provided through donations and fundraising. 
Commoners can interact with stories and their authors in different ways: by reading these 
stories, leaving comments, or taking inspiration for the reproduction of authors’ experiences 
elsewhere. An example view of this section on desktop and mobile is shown in Figure 1.  
The platform also has a section where commoners can exchange both material and 
immaterial resources (such as skills and services) to mutually improve their living conditions. 
The exchange of these goods and services is facilitated by a digital exchange token called 
“Commoncoin”, which is awarded monthly to users as a form of digital basic income. The 
underlying motivation is that a complementary digital token could stimulate interactions and 
 
thus break down boundaries between communities that might otherwise find it difficult to 
initiate sharing practices. 
The ethos of Commonfare.net values the provision of mutual support and activities that lead 
to communal benefit. From a collective action perspective, cooperation is an essential 
component of a strong and valuable commonfare. As in the physical offline world, trust is 
important in facilitating and encouraging cooperation, especially among commoners that 
potentially do not know each other directly, as well as identifying potential deviance from 
acceptable behaviours.  
A new theoretical framing for reputation system design - commonshare 
The overarching goal of assessing and rewarding contributions to the common good of 
Commonfare.net required the design of a reputation system that differed from existing 
mainstream individualistic models, and that otherwise embodied a more collective approach 
to reputation. Moreover, the approach was required to be computable (i.e., it would allow us 
to measure contributions to the development of a common good, to produce a metric 
supporting trust within the community). These two fundamental requirements suggested that 
an alternative approach could be found in the work of DeLanda and his Assemblage Theory 
(DeLanda, 2019). This is a theory for the study of social complexity and sees social 
phenomena through their emergent rather than their essential properties. Assemblages are 
described as social wholes “that cannot be reduced to the persons that compose them, but 
that do not totalise them either, fusing them into a seamless whole in which their individuality 
is lost" (DeLanda, 2019, p. 9). In an assemblage, the whole (e.g. the community) and the parts 
(e.g. individuals) exist through complex forms of aggregation. Thus, for example, social groups 
or even societies can be studied as assemblages where the task for the researchers is to 
account for how relations among the parts of the assemblages are not fixed but rather in flux 
and can stabilise through aggregation. The theory departs radically from other social theories 
that see social phenomena (whether individual or collective) as fixed and defined by well 
established and unchanging properties and that, as a consequence, often operate various 
forms of reductionism. One example of such reductionism is methodological individualism and 
the idea that social phenomena are just an aggregation of individual components (DeLanda, 
2006). 
 
In his work, DeLanda cites reputation within a community as a relevant example of how 
“assemblages” work. DeLanda provides various examples of how close-knit communities are 
held together by reciprocal obligations. These communities are an example of the 
"assemblages" of the theory.  Viewing communities through the lens of Assemblage Theory, 
reputation is not an essential property of an individual (e.g., the babysitter or e-commerce 
seller referenced in the previous section). Rather, it is an emergent effect of the relations 
between individuals and the whole of the community, such that communities (e.g. the friends 
of the parents and the babysitters) have the capacity to store reputations of individuals as a 
sort of collective memory of the whole. Indeed, on this, DeLanda (2019, p. 21) remarks that 
“Assemblages emerge from the interactions between their parts, but once an assemblage is 
in place it immediately starts acting as a source of limitations and opportunities for its 
components”. A good reputation may deliver new work opportunities for the babysitter, a bad 
reputation instead will just impose inherent limits or sanctions such as refusal of work 
opportunities. Moreover, when reciprocal obligations and enforcement against violations 
function properly, the community as an assemblage develops a set of dense relations among 
 
its members. Density is defined by the author as “the degree to which everyone knows 
everyone else” (DeLanda, 2019, p. 10). Again, it is important to remark that this density is 
contingent and can change further (e.g. decrease) via the interactions amongst the parts of 
the assemblage. 
 
DeLanda also remarks that the relations within the community need to be "maintained in good 
shape" in order for a community as an assemblage to have good density, providing examples 
that are either material (such as looking after each other’s children) or expressive, such as 
"listening to problems and giving advice in difficult situations" (DeLanda, 2019, p. 30). Seen in 
this way, reputation is neither something that an individual can accumulate as a sort of capital, 
nor simply the pursuit of individual self-satisfaction. Reputation becomes an emergent property 
of the community as an assemblage. It emerges from interactions of the parts of the 
assemblage rather than being inherent and an essential property of individuals. From this 
perspective, reputation is effectively stored as the density of community network relations from 
which individuals may benefit or be sanctioned, simply by being part of the community 
assemblage.  
 
DeLanda's Assemblage Theory is closely related to other social theoretical perspectives such 
as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) that pay explicit attention to the role of non-human actants 
(Latour, 2007) including the material and the digital in social relationships and interactions. 
There are many parallels between the two approaches (Müller, 2015), since ANT also adopts 
a non-essentialist stance and accounts for the shifting networked relations of social 
phenomena. The key aspect of ANT for our research is the symmetrical focus on human and 
non-human actors (called actants) in these networks of relations. Indeed, from an ANT 
perspective, both humans and non-humans (i.e., digital objects) are considered equally 
important in the emergence of agency, knowledge and trust from the network, with actants 
themselves understood to be products of the relationships between each other (Latour, 1987, 
2007). For our modeling of a novel approach to online reputation, such a sociomaterial 
perspective would suggest that digital communities are more than just networks of people, but 
also of digital artifacts and digital content (Lepa & Tatnall, 2006; Pelizza, 2018). Moreover, it 
is the set of relations among these heterogenous actants that shape the actants themselves. 
For example, in the case of Commonfare.net, we have digital objects such as stories, digital 
currencies, and comments from commoners on these objects, in addition to commoners 
themselves. Commoners and digital objects mutually shape each other in the network of 
relations that are thereby formed. Thus, the assumptions underlying ANT would allow us to 
see both commoners and digital objects as part of a potential assemblage, and reputation 
would be the outcome of this heterogeneous set of relations. 
 
We have therefore decided to combine the needs of Commonfare.net, the ANT-based idea of 
symmetry between humans and digital objects, and DeLanda's intuitions about reputation, in 
order to design a new approach for facilitating collective trust. We conceptualise the 
interactions that take place on Commonfare.net as a social network, whose sustained 
interactions strengthen the network in its entirety, fostering an increased density. In our 
approach, reputation is stored by the assemblage as a property of its relation density, which 
is then represented to the individual as the contribution of their actions within the community.  
 
This approach is radically different to the individualistic model wherein reputation is 
accumulated by individuals, pursuing their self-satisfaction (e.g. Smith, 1776). Moreover, this 
 
approach will allow us to overcome the limits of individualism for the design of online reputation 
(e.g. Dellarocas, 2010). In the approach we propose, the density and level of activity within a 
networked community such as Commonfare.net are taken to be indications of the strength or 
value of the community and of the common that it has built. This value is created in all 
interactions, including those in which a user asks for advice, guidance or material help, and is 
not limited to contributions where someone answers a question, provides a solution or delivers 
a commercial exchange. In Commonfare.net, commoners wish to be acknowledged for their 
contributions to the common and not for the delivery of a service, such that each commoner 
creates and owns a share of the common value. Hence, we refer to this as their commonshare 
- the individual share of the wider common good created by the community within the platform. 
 
Social network analysis for building a commonshare 
Designing a reputation system that captures the notion of reputation as a distributed and 
emergent construct requires a model that can account for a whole and its density, and from 
which individual reputations effectively arise. DeLanda’s work offers hints for a computational 
solution for modelling reputation in an assemblage. DeLanda remarks that in these cases, "we 
are dealing with assemblages that can be analysed using the resources offered by social 
network theory" (DeLanda, 2019, p. 29). In other words, social network analysis could afford 
the ability to mathematically model an assemblage approach to reputation, developing the 
following two properties:  
 
1. The community's global form of reputation, defined as the “commonshare” 
2. Each participant's individual portion of this global commonshare 
 
In this section, we briefly describe some key concepts of social network analysis that enable 
us to model these properties. Metrics that have been developed in mathematical graph theory 
can be related to underlying social structures across the network, or to properties of individuals 
within these structures (Newman, 2003). Considering social networks as mathematical 
graphs, each actor in the network (human or non-human) is a node, and any relationship 
between these nodes represents an edge. With this terminology, we are interested in 
properties of nodes and their edges that are indicative of influence in a network, termed as 
“centrality metrics”, as well as global properties of the network's node-edge relations, from 
which insights can be obtained into overall community behaviours. 
 
With respect to centrality, Freeman (1978) describes three primary measures as applied to 
the simple star network shown in Figure 2. In this network, the node labelled ‘p3’ is intuitively 
the central node, which Freeman formalises in three different ways. Its degree centrality 
(number of direct connections to other nodes) is 4, whereas all other nodes have a degree of 
1. It has a high betweenness centrality, as it is a necessary point of traversal on the path 
between any other two nodes in the network. Finally, it has a high closeness centrality, as it 
is at most one edge away from all other nodes, whereas these peripheral nodes are two edges 
away from one another.   
 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
Figure 2: Freeman’s simple network to illustrate centrality measures (Freeman, 1978) 
 
 
Calculating the commonshare  
From the considerations and assumptions of previous sections, a platform like 
Commonfare.net can be conceptualised as a social network where commoners’ interactions 
are mediated by content such as stories, posts describing available goods, skills or services, 
as well as profile pages for individuals and groups. A suitable representation for this network 
must satisfy the following requirements: 
 
1. It should capture the dynamics by which the platform’s community creates and 
accesses the common wealth of content shared online. 
2. It should clearly illustrate the commoners and content that most strongly contribute to 
the cohesion, sustainability and growth of the platform. 
 
We therefore model the network as a dynamic graph, which captures the emergence of 
aggregated complex dynamics formed from local interactions at the user level. High-level 
insights into community activity can be inferred from actions such as creating and sharing 
content, leaving comments on content, or replying to such comments (as well as the order in 
which these actions are taken). 
 
These actions are logged in the platform database, which allows us to reconstruct the 
structural dynamics between platform users and their created content. To model the 
assemblage as an evolving graph, we start by considering two sets of nodes: the set of 
platform users, and the set of their created digital objects. New objects are created, and new 
users join the platform, causing these sets to grow over time. We assume an initial set of 
objects and users exist at the beginning. When a commoner A posts a new story, she is the 
owner and a link exists a priori between her and this story. If another commoner B leaves a 
comment, a link will be created between B and the story. Further, an additional link will be 
created between A and her story, which represents the strengthening of the contribution she 
has made. Links between commoners can also be created irrespective of content, through 
conversations or transactions of digital currency. These interaction types, and their 
directionality, are illustrated in Figure 3.  
 
<Insert Figure 3 here> 
Figure 3: Interaction types and their directionality in Commonfare.net 
 
This node-link graph structure of user interactions - the assemblage - allows us to determine 
each commoner's influence in the network. There are several such methods to determine how 
influential (central) a node is, which reflect its relationship with the wider network structure and 
how it contributes to the overall density, some of which we reference in Figure 2. For 
Commonfare.net however, we decided to use the coreness metric. The advantage of this 
metric is that it connects an individual to a global structural property of the assemblage as 
opposed to a local one. In other words, it allows us to model the whole-part relation, 
fundamental to the notion of an assemblage, providing an accurate measure of a node's 
influence and allowing us to model an assemblage approach to reputation.  
 
Use of k-core algorithm 
Our measure of an individual's contribution to the common value is primarily based on their 
core number within a k-core decomposition of the aforementioned interaction network. A k-
core is a maximal subgraph (the largest subgraph in which all nodes are reachable from each 
 
other) that consists of nodes with a degree of at least k. The core number of a node is the 
largest value k of a k-core containing that node. We use a Python implementation of an 
algorithm introduced by Batagelj and Zaversnik (2011), which is included in the NetworkX 
Python package1. The 𝑂(𝑚) time complexity of this algorithm (where 𝑚 is the number of 
edges) enables a rapid calculation for all nodes in the network. Pseudocode for this 
decomposition algorithm is given in Algorithm 1, with an example k-core decomposition 
illustrated in Figure 4.  
 
<Insert Algorithm 1 here>    <Insert Figure 4 here> 
       Figure 4. Example k-core decomposition 
 
As Figure 4 shows, an advantage of the core number metric is that it considers a node's 
influence with respect to the global graph structure, as opposed to a localised measure of 
influence, such as its degree. For example, although node A in this figure has a higher degree 
than node B, the interactions of the latter are with other pivotal members of the network. As 
such, the k-core decomposition method can be applied to identify influential members of social 
networks - an approach that has been verified in previous studies of Twitter influencers (Brown 
& Feng, 2011), and protest movements on Twitter (González-Bailón et al., 2011). We therefore 
use a node's core number as a base measure of its impact in the interaction network of 
Commonfare.net, and thereby the commonshare of the commoner whom it represents.  
 
Modifications for dynamic, weighted networks 
In this work, we have followed Garas et al. (2012) in modifying the original k-core 
decomposition to allow different weights to be assigned to different interaction types. We adopt 
the following heuristic principles (they are not guaranteed to yield optimal values, but instead 
serve as practical guidelines): 
 
1. Interaction types may be weighted differently: In Commonfare.net, interactions are 
diverse, from transferring digital currency to leaving a comment on a story. Each 
interaction is given a weight in both directions based on our own estimates of 
significance. These estimates should be tuned in future based on commoners’ input.  
2. Interaction weights decrease over time: As a dynamic network, commoners’ level 
of contribution at a particular point in time is dependent on how recently their 
interactions took place. Links between commoners are easy to form but require 
continued effort to maintain their strength. 
3. Repeated interactions decrease in weight: The growth of Commonfare.net relies on 
commoners establishing new interactions. While multiple interactions increase the 
weight of an edge between nodes, subsequent interactions along the same edge 
decrease in value, reducing the impact of potentially collusive behaviour. 
 
Our proposed modifications to the k-core decomposition algorithm account for the weighted, 
directed, dynamic properties of the assemblage. Fair calculation of the commonshare is 
important for understanding and encouraging further platform use. The following section 
describes the implementation of these principles, as well as the commonshare calculation 






This section briefly details the implementation of the processing pipeline we employ for this 
calculation - beginning with a GEXF (Graph Exchange XML Format) file and ending with a 
series of JSON files for visualisation2. Presently, graph files that are in other formats (such as 
GraphML, DOT or CSV) are imported into Gephi3, a graph visualisation platform, and exported 
into the required GEXF format. Thus, our approach can be used for any graph format 
supported by Gephi.  
 
Preliminary parsing 
To be read by the scripts for commonshare calculation and JSON graph generation, the GEXF 
file must conform to certain constraints, described as follows and illustrated in Figure 5a. 
 
<Insert Figure 5 here> 
 Figure 5. Steps involved in calculating weighted commonshare of a graph 
 
Removal of loops 
For the k-core calculation to operate correctly, all edges where the source node is also the 
target are removed. Given that the premise of commonshare is based on one's interactions 
with others in a social network, it should not be possible to accumulate reputation by interacting 
with oneself. 
 
Merging of bi-directional edges 
Parallel edges must be reduced to a single edge, while retaining the attributes of both edges. 
For example, an edge from a node x to another node y may have a different weight to that of 
the edge from y to x. To differentiate the two, we simply append the source node ID onto the 
value of the attribute, delimited by a forward slash. Figure 6 illustrates the change in node-
edge structure alongside changes to the underlying GEXF.  
 
<Insert Figure 6 here> 
Figure 6. Removal of parallel, directed edges in GEXF 
 
Dynamic subgraph generation 
To understand the dynamic nature of network activity, an interval is chosen on which to 
segment the entire time-stamped graph into windowed snapshots. In the case of 
Commonfare.net, we use a two-week interval, such that subgraphs are generated for every 
two-week window of activity, with no overlap of these windows.  
 
Timestamp filtering (Figure 5b) 
As shown in the lower half of Figure 6, “spell” attributes are appended to edges (as well as 
nodes) that represent the time periods in which they existed. Each edge and node must have 
a spell start or end that exists in the window, otherwise it is removed.  
 
 
2 Source code for our implementation is available at https://github.com/Commonfare-net/commonshare 
3 https://gephi.org/ 
 
Irrelevant edge removal (Figure 5c) 
In the case of Commonfare.net, all edges that connect commoners or stories to “tag” nodes 
are not indicative of a contribution and therefore must be removed to avoid influencing the k-
core algorithm. At this point, the degree of each node can be calculated. 
 
Node weighting (Figure 5d) 
In addition to the node's degree, each node is given a weight based on the attributes of its 
edges, thereby distinguishing it from the original k-core algorithm. For each edge, the following 
may be present in a network dataset for determining edge weight: 
 
1. No additional information: This is often the case in existing datasets, which simply 
document that an edge exists between two nodes with no further information. 
2. A “weight” edge attribute: Network datasets may include an explicit edge weight 
attribute. For example, in trust networks, this weight corresponds to the source 
node's trust ranking of the target node. 
3. Number of parallel edges: During the preliminary parsing phase, the number of 
times either node initiated an interaction is stored. When no other information is 
present, this number is used as a proxy for the edge's weight. 
4. Weighted action type attributes: In the case of Commonfare.net, an edge weight 
can be inferred by the actions between nodes that it represents. Algorithm 2 shows 
the process by which this weight is calculated. 
 
<Insert Algorithm 2 here> 
 
In lines 5 and 6 of this algorithm, the age of the action is determined, and the age depreciation 
factor 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎 is calculated. The weight of the action is then reduced by 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎  and the multiple 
depreciation factor 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚, which reduces the weight of recurring interactions. Each node's 
degree (𝑑0) is then adjusted by its edge weight sum (𝑊) An edge cannot be allocated a 
negative degree but decreases towards 0 over time.  
 
K-core decomposition (Figure 5e) 
The standard k-core decomposition algorithm described in Algorithm 1 is then applied to the 
weighted subgraph, which returns the core number of each node. Each node's core number 
is then normalised to a value between 1 and 10 for simplicity of representation, the result of 
which represents the individual's commonshare. Finally, each weighted subgraph is output as 
a separate JSON file. 
 
Individual commoner graph generation 
JSON files are generated for each commoner, containing their ego-centric subgraph for each 
time period. In the visualisations described in the next section, this allows individual 
representations of one’s commonshare, and the interactions that have contributed to it, to be 
displayed efficiently.  
 
Cumulative graph generation 
Finally, a JSON file is output for the aggregated graph of all interactions. In this graph, the 
steps taken to calculate a node's overall commonshare are identical to those in the 
 
aforementioned subgraph generation, with additional steps based on two aggregated activity 
heuristics: 
 
● A commoner's overall commonshare is proportional to their weeks of activity. All else 
being equal, we consider commoners who have been consistently active for the 
duration of Commonfare.net to have a stronger reputation than those with one or two 
weeks of intense activity. 
● A commoner's overall commonshare is proportional to the subsequent activity of 
commoners whom they interact with - interactions with other users that do not generate 
any further activity should be weighted less than interactions with users that continue 
to participate in the platform. 
 
The first metric, periods of activity (𝐴), is simply a count of how many biweekly subgraphs a 
node has existed in. The second metric, neighbourly activity (𝐵), is edge-determinant, and 
represents the fraction of weeks a node's neighbour N was active following their first 
interaction. Every edge weight will be equally influenced by the overall activity of the node in 
question (𝐴), but also influenced by the neighbour's subsequent activity (𝐵). The min function 
assures that the edge's weight is never increased by the adjustment. Further, an edge's weight 
is at least 0.1 (when 𝐵 = 0). 
The resultant commonshare distribution is log-normal, as shown in Figure 7 (left). A 
Box-Cox transformation is then applied to the data to yield a more normal distribution, giving 
the output shown in Figure 7 (middle). These transformed values can then be normalised to 
discrete integer values between 1 and 10, as performed for the periodic subgraphs.  
While charts such as those in Figure 7 give a basic understanding of the distribution of 
commoners’ activity, they do not provide insights to the structure of the community, for which 
different visualisations are required, described in the following section. 
 
<Insert Figure 7 here> 
Figure 7. Commonshare distribution (left); after Box-Cox transformation; after normalisation 
 
 
VISUALISATIONS OF COMMONSHARE 
Previous work demonstrates how well-designed graphical representations can inform 
decision-making and encourage critical engagement (Pocock et al., 2016; Gilbert & 
Karahalios, 2009; Valkanova et al., 2013). In this section, we describe the trial commonshare 
visualisations implemented for Commonfare.net and their evaluation by platform 
administrators. We developed two separate visualisations intended to communicate 
information on both the network and personal commonshare values. For administrators, a 
community visualisation was implemented, showing the platform's network of commoners 
and stories, and the interactions between them. For individuals, we implemented personal 
visualisations that aim to succinctly represent a commoner's platform interaction history.  
 
Community visualisation of commonshare 
The community visualisation is a graph-like representation of all interactions in the history of 
Commonfare.net, shown in Figure 8. Circles represent actants in the network - purple circles 
are commoners, red circles are stories, and the small number of blue circles are listings. Circle 
 
size is directly proportional to the represented actant's commonshare, with the intensity of link 
colour indicating the strength of the interaction between two actants.  
 
<Insert Figure 8 here> 
Figure 8:  Visualisation of aggregated community activity and two biweekly snapshots 
 
Two temporal snapshot graphs (Figure 8, S1 and S2) show interactions over two different two-
week periods. These snapshots are visualised for every two-week period in the platform's 
history, allowing for its dynamic properties to be observed that are otherwise lost through 
aggregation. For example, the highlighted "BIN Italia" commoner has an overall commonshare 
value of 10 in the aggregated graph, but this fluctuates over time and may be significantly less 
in any given period, as shown in S1 where this commoner obtained a commonshare of 1 due 
to a period of inactivity.  
The commonshare calculation and visualisation were initially developed by simulating 
random interaction data with different parameters. As platform activity increased, it became 
possible to test the commonshare calculation on real platform data. By comparing algorithmic 
output to our knowledge of key platform members, we refined our weighted k-core 
decomposition to obtain output that reflects our perceptions of members' contributions. We 
discuss three areas (highlighted in Figure 8) from which particular insights were obtained. 
 
 
Figure 8A - network centre  
The centre of the Commonfare.net network is highlighted by this dense cluster of nodes with 
a high commonshare. The majority of these nodes are commoners who have been integral 
in sharing and encouraging widespread use of the platform, reflected in their commonshare 
values. As a network of objects as well as people, various stories and listings are also 
central to the network, and their position in the visualisation is indicative of their importance 
for cultivating platform actions. Such stories tend to be emotionally strong, eliciting 
responses from pivotal Commonfare.net members as well as those outside the core.  
 
Figure 8B - detached pilot  
This cluster of nodes represents commoners who took part in a week-long pilot study of the 
platform's digital currency transaction system. This took place at an art festival, where 
participants could purchase goods and services from vendors through Commonfare.net 
transactions. Figure 9 shows the interactions and resultant commonshare of participants in 
the 2-week snapshot during which the pilot took place, with hundreds of transactions 
between users, generating high commonshare for all involved. However, the aggregated 
visualisation in Figure 8 shows that very few pilot participants continued to engage with the 
platform. This is reflected in the distancing of this cluster from the network core, and the 
significant reduction in the overall commonshare of these nodes through a lack of further 
interactions.  
 
Figure 8C - administrative node 
The node highlighted in this section of the graph has clearly been highly active, including 
various interactions with more central nodes, yet has a comparatively small overall 
commonshare. The node's high degree represents a number of welfare information and 
tutorial posts created by the administrator at an early stage of the platform (shown in Figure 
10). As these stories present information, they do not attract sustained engagement and 
 
therefore do not contribute to the administrator's overall impact. While this is a special case 
of honest intent (paramount to the bootstrapping of the platform content) it also mimics the 
behaviour of a potential “spammer”, creating meaningless content to artificially boost their 
commonshare. Thus, while the user may receive a temporary boost in commonshare, this 
rapidly diminishes through a lack of further engagement. 
 
<Insert Figure 9 here>     <Insert Figure 10 here> 
Figure 9.  Interactions in the two-week period   Figure 10. Two-week snapshot where an   
during which the art festival pilot took place       administrator user created public benefits 
 
Personal visualisation 
Personal visualisations are displayed on commoners' profile pages, showing their 
contributions to the collective commonshare as a form of reputation for establishing trust with 
other commoners of the platform, as well as motivating further contributions. Examples of 
these visualisations are shown in Figure 11.  
<Insert Figure 11 here> 
Figure 11.  Donut and line chart personal visualisations 
 
We used both a donut chart and line chart to display the commoner's commonshare for a 
two-week period (the central number in the donut or the height of the thick orange line at a 
given point on the line chart's x-axis). They also show the types of interaction the commoner 
has engaged in to obtain this commonshare. In the example shown, story interactions 
contribute to most of the commonshare, with social interactions also making a contribution. 
While the line chart provides an instant view of the temporal fluctuations in the commoner's 
interactions, the donut provides more detail for a given time period, as shown by its 
interactive features in Figure 12. The centre of the three examples shows the result of 
clicking on the “story” section of the donut in the left example. Key features include: 
 
● The commonshare value is replaced by circles, each of which represents an interaction 
of the previously selected type - in this case, story interactions. 
● The circle's size represents the weight of this interaction relative to others of the same 
type.  
● The two letters in each circle are the first two letters of the actant (the username for 
users, or title for stories/listings) with which the interaction took place. 
● Hovering over a circle gives the full title of the actant involved in the interaction (except 
for transactions) and the type of interaction undertaken. 
<Insert Figure 12 here> 
Figure 12. Updated donut visualisation with further details 
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION 
The commonshare concept and calculation offers an approach to evidencing and recognising 
contributions to community building, particularly for communities that collaborate towards 
creating common resources. The commonshare is calculated on the basis of interactions and 
relations that serve to stabilise, sustain and grow a community, and thus provides community 
members with a measure of how committed and active other members are. Such information 
may then serve as a basis for judgments of whom and/or what to interact with in an online 
 
platform, such that the commonshare is a form of reputation. However, the commonshare is 
clearly distinct from individualistic, competitive and accumulative aspects of mainstream 
approaches to online reputation design (Dellarocas, 2010; Farmer and Glass, 2010), which 
are not unlike what Smith (1776) conceptualised as ‘good conduct’ in commercial societies. 
Our involvement in the design of the overall Commonfare.net platform led us to consider how 
reputation models that are centred on individual self-satisfaction are also ill-suited to a digital 
platform that aims to foster cooperation, mutual support and the creation of a common. For 
this reason we took a different point of departure for our design, that of the Assemblage Theory 
(DeLanda, 2019) which sees reputation as an emergent property of social wholes (like 
communities) rather than as an essential property of individuals. 
 
Our approach is not a wholesale criticism of individualistic reputation design models, which 
clearly work efficiently in certain contexts (e.g., e-commerce) but instead a criticism of applying 
individualism to design when the community ethos is based on collective action and the 
common rather than, for example, maximisation of personal interest for economic or social 
reasons (Wilson and De Paoli, 2019). Our proposed approach offers thus an alternative for 
reputation design. We contend that, for communities geared toward collective action and the 
building of a common, individual actors or actants should be awarded reputation based on the 
articulation of their relation to the community. By taking the work of DeLanda (2019) on 
assemblages as a theoretical basis, we have demonstrated that it is feasible to produce a 
novel reputation metric that is based on global properties of a community and the individual’s 
place within it. Specifically, in our research, we used social network analysis to produce a 
reputation metric, which captures the share of community members’ contribution to the 
common. We used the k-core decomposition algorithm (Batagelj & Zaveršnik, 2011) to 
determine the strength of commoners’ positions within the interaction network, with 
modifications to account for the age, strength and direction of their interactions. 
 
Even though we mitigate the issue of biased ratings, any reputation or scoring system may 
still be subject to cases of manipulation (Dellarocas, 2010). In our work, we anticipated that 
colluding users could try to boost their own commonshare by repeatedly conducting fictitious 
interactions among themselves or by “spamming” the platform with meaningless stories. Our 
algorithm design anticipates manipulation by reducing the value of repeated interactions or 
those that generate no sustained impact, and our community visualisation also makes such 
behaviours easily identifiable to platform administrators. 
 
The Commonfare.net platform is currently in its bootstrapping phase, with the project funding 
finished and the creation of a public association of volunteers tasked (with limited resources) 
to foster its continuous use. While this imposes some limits on our future work on the 
commonshare as implemented in Commonfare.net, we are exploring its potential use in other 
platforms. Thus, our future work will be shaped through the actionable insights we generate 
by continuing to work on the platform as volunteers, while looking for other applications of the 
commonshare. One question is how best to conceptualise the commonshare for the digital 
content that commoners create. Following the assumption of the symmetry between humans 
and non-humans (Latour, 2007), our algorithms already operate on all nodes in a network, 
whether human or non-human. Although the commonshare metric may not be relevant to 
certain content (for example, temporary listings of items or services available) it could be 
applied to generate new insights into platform content that continues to be interacted with over 
time. For example, stories that are frequently read and commented on would have a high 
 
commonshare, which would give a clear indication of their importance to the community. This 
would differ from a traditional ratings system, as the measure of quality is derived from the 
dynamics of the assemblage. 
 
To conclude, we have described the underlying research, implementation and subsequent 
visualisations for a novel conceptualisation of reputation called commonshare. This approach 
incorporates principles of Assemblage Theory into a novel design that employs methods from 
social network analysis. Commonshare differs substantially from individualistic and 
accumulative approaches to reputation such as rating systems on e-commerce platforms. We 
have implemented our solutions in the nascent DSI platform Commonfare.net and offered 
insights from its operation. We believe that our contribution will be most relevant to 
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Algorithm 1: The Batagelj and Zaveršnik algorithm 
for k-core decomposition 
Data: graph 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) 
Result: table core[𝑣] contains the k-coreness of 𝑣 ∈
𝑉 
Init: Order 𝑉 by degree[𝑣] for all 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉; 
for 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 do 
core[𝑣] ← degree[𝑣]; 
for 𝑢 ∈ neighbours[𝑣] do 
if degree[𝑢] > degree[𝑣] then 
degree[𝑢] ← degree[𝑢] −1; 





Algorithm 2: Calculating the weight of a node based on its interactions 
Data: graph 𝐺, node 𝑁, start date 𝐷0, end date 𝐷1 
Result: weight of 𝑁, from period 𝐷0 … 𝐷1 
Init: 𝑊 ← [ ]; 
for 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒 ∈ 𝐺. 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑠 do 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝒎 ← 1, 𝑤 ← 0; 
for 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ← 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒. 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 do 
𝑎𝑔𝑒 ← 𝐝𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐟𝐟(𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝐷1); 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎 ← 𝑒
−0.01×𝑎𝑔𝑒; 
𝑤 ← 𝑤 + (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛. 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 × 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑎 × 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚); 
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚 ← 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑚 × 0.75; 
𝑊. append(𝑤); 
return ∑ 𝑊 
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